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Abstract 
This study empirically examines the association between the attributes of the board of directors and audit committee on 
accounting conservatism. Results from panel data analysis for 300 Malaysian listed firms observed from 2001 to 2007 show 
that boards with at least four annually audit committee meetings and higher proportion of independent directors and financial 
expertise, are faster in recognising bad news into earnings relative to the good news. In addition, it is proven that both 
independent directors and financial expertise in audit committee nor the board size and CEO duality are associated with 
conservatism.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the link between board of directors and audit committee with accounting conservatism 
following the empirical evidence that conservatism mitigates the agency conflict. It is expected that effective board 
of directors and audit committee with good governance practices would use conservative accounting to assist them 
in controlling agency conflict and in producing transparent financial reporting. Most studies done before assessed 
the effectiveness of the board of directors or audit committee on Malaysian financial reporting in relation to 
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earnings management, firm performance, financial distress status and disclosure on corporate social responsibility. 
None so far has assessed them with conservative accounting. According to a survey performed by Ismail and 
Abdullah (1999), 73% of the financial analysts agreed with the notions that conservatism can improve earnings 
quality and it is influenced by the audit committee. However, the study did not provide empirical evidence on the 
association between audit committees and conservatism. Even if empirical evidence is available, it is mainly from 
developed countries. For instance, UK studies done by Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) which focused on the 
board composition; US studies by A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) which examined several characteristics of 
the board of directors whilst Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) illustrated attributes of the audit committee in 
addition to those the board of directors. Thus, there is a need to identify whether their results are applicable in 
Malaysia, especially for studies on UK firms, since the Malaysian code on corporate governance largely follows 
the UK code. 
This study uses asymmetric timeliness to measure conservatism. The results depict that owning independent 
directors and financial expertise on board and holding at least four audit committee meetings annually, have 
positive effects on conservatism. It is also proven that neither independent directors on audit committee, board size 
nor CEO duality is associated with conservatism. 
 Significantly, results of this study may benefit policy makers such as Securities Commission and Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance in assessing the strength of the firms’ governance structure. Creditors will also 
benefit from the findings because comprehending factors that contribute to lower conservatism may assist them in 
evaluating their client effectively. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous evidence on accounting 
conservatism and the internal governance mechanisms. Section 3 discusses the research design, regression models 
and measurements of the variables while Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussions. Lastly, section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Accounting conservatism 
Conservatism is traditionally defined as accounting practices that “anticipate no profit but anticipate all losses” 
(Bliss, 1924). Watts (2003) stated that the ability of conservatism to limit manager’s opportunistic behaviors could 
increase firms value, and thus protect the interests of minority shareholders. Accounting conservatism benefits 
corporate governance as losses are recognized immediately, and quick action can be taken to identify underlying 
reasons. Evidence showed that conservative accounting is more useful in controlling the cost of sub-optimal 
managerial decisions than if earnings are reported neutrally or liberally (Kwon, 2005). LaFond and Watts (2008) 
reported that conservatism constrains managers from hiding unfavorable information because accounting 
conservatism provides hard information on verifiable gains and possible losses. Evidence is proven by Lara, Osma 
and Neophytou (2009) as UK bankrupt firms practiced lower conservatism prior to their failure. In addition to 
reducing managers’ opportunistic behavior, conservatism ultimately improves the quality of the financial 
information. For instance, conservatism increased the ability of current earnings to forecast future cash flows (Kim 
& Kross, 2005); and conservatism increased the value relevance of the earnings since it prevented opportunistic 
managers from using accounting choices that favored their personal interest (Brown, He, & Teitel, 2006). 
Furthermore, conservatism reduced managers’ incentives to manage earnings because timeliness in incorporating 
losses into earnings reduces the impact of bad news on the share price (Chen, Hemmer, & Zhang, 2007); and 
creditors reward firms that employ higher conservatism with lower interest because conservatism provides an early 
signal to the lender of any possible debt violation (Zhang, 2008).  
2.2. Independent directors 
 
A UK study carried out by Beekes et al. (2004) and a US study done by A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007), 
both identified that higher proportions of independent directors on the board were associated with higher levels of 
conservative accounting. Evidence also shows that audit committee independence mitigates agency conflict (see: 
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McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996; Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2007). On the other hand, Owens-Jackson, 
Robinson and Shelton (2009) demonstrated that fraud occurred in the reported earnings, even if the committee was 
comprised wholly of independent directors. This evidence is consistent with the results from meta-analysis carried 
out by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) which indicated that audit committee independence is more effective in 
improving the quality of the audit than the quality of the financial statements. They found that audit committee 
independence had a weak relationship with accounting accruals and in avoiding financial restatements but was 
strongly associated with auditor ratification and averting auditor resignation. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
found that audit committee independence did not influence accounting conservatism for US firms. This study 
presents the following hypothesis, 
H1: The proportion of independent directors on the board is positively related to conservative accounting. 
H2: The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee is positively related to conservative 
accounting. 
2.3. Financial expertise 
The findings of Agrawal and Chadha (2005) on US firms showed that outside directors with financial expertise 
influenced the probability of firms being required to restate their accounts. Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
examined several types of financial expertise including financial executives, finance professors and bank 
executives. Among three types of expertise, only financial executives promoted better governance as they led to 
less value-destroying acquisition, whilst the others either had no positive contribution to the benefit of the 
shareholders or led to higher debt even though the firms had low investment opportunities. Previous studies 
established that financial expertise on the audit committee reduced earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou, & 
Courteau, 2004), led to less restatement of earnings (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004) and employed more 
conservative accounting (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Since, users of the financial statements rely on the 
competency of directors to oversee the process of the financial reporting; it is more likely that financial expertise 
employs more conservatism to assist in their governance roles. It is hypothesized that, 
H3: The proportion of financial expertise on the board is positively related to conservative accounting. 
H4: The proportion of financial expertise on the audit committee is positively related to conservative accounting. 
 
2.4. Board size 
 
Empirical studies provided more support on small board size to be associated with effective governance; where 
it led to higher returns-earnings relation suggesting that fewer board members were better informed on the earnings 
of the firm (Vafeas, 2000) and for a significantly small board, adding more members increased the share return but 
when the size reached a certain limit, adding more directors would reduce performance (Larmou & Vafeas, 2010). 
Dalton and Dalton (2005) claimed that large board is advantageous in terms of broader knowledge among its 
members, but Jensen (1993) had argued that the problem of coordination for large board size can outweigh the 
benefit. Proven by the empirical findings that large board size led to low firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 
2009; Mak & Li, 2001), high earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006), low earnings informativeness (K. 
Ahmed, Hossain, & Adams, 2006) and increased the occurrence of financial distress status (Chang, 2009). This 
study presents the following hypothesis, 
H5: Board size is inversely related to conservative accounting. 
2.5. CEO duality 
Agency theory argues that CEO and chairman roles should be separated since the board responsibility is to 
monitor the management including the CEO. The stewardship theory however, perceives that the duality roles 
improve leadership as there is no information breakdown between the CEO and the board. Jensen (1993, p. 866) 
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argued that the CEO cannot become the chairman of the board because the chairman needs to independently run 
the board meeting, oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO. In contrast, 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) and Klein (1998) argued that the combined structure allows the CEO cum 
chairman to make timely and optimal decisions and improve the effectiveness of the board because the inside 
directors possess more knowledge and expertise about the firms’ activities which outside directors might be 
lacking. Empirical evidence has shown that the combined structure was ineffective monitors (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995; Klein, 2002; Muniandy, 2007) whilst the separate structure was proven to be a stronger 
mechanism (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Rahman & Haniffa, 2005). This study posits that the joint structure 
will lead to less conservatism, and hence presents the following hypothesis, 
H6: CEO duality is inversely related to conservative accounting. 
2.6. Audit committee meeting 
Frequency of audit committee meeting is an indication of the diligence of the audit committee members as they 
would normally resolve issues with the auditors in a formal meeting. Therefore, frequent meetings reflect active 
committee membership (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). Empirical studies showed that frequent audit committee 
meetings led to lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004), reduced the possibility of restatement 
(Abbott et al., 2004) and lowered fraud occurrence (Owens-Jackson et al., 2009). Accordingly, it is perceived that 
audit committee members who hold meetings frequently are concerned with the quality of the financial reports; 
and hence will likely demand more conservatism. This study presents the following hypothesis, 
H7: The frequency of audit committee meeting is positively related to conservative accounting. 
3. Methodology 
This study examined non-financial listed firm on Bursa Malaysia from 2001 to 2007, where in 2001 Malaysian 
listed firms were required to make mandatory disclosure of the extent of compliance (or non-compliance) with the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance adopted in 2000.  
Asymmetric Timeliness introduced by Basu (1997) is used to measure accounting conservatism.Share returns 
are used as a proxy for news about firm performance. Timeliness in earnings is measured using a reverse-
regression between earnings and contemporaneous returns that captures the difference in the effects of negative 
returns and positive returns on earnings. A dummy variable (D) interacts with the return variable (R) to proxy for 
bad news (RD) whilst the main effect on return (R) is a proxy for good news. Basu’s regression model is 
presented as follows: 
 
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + εit  (1) 
 
The sensitivity of earnings to good news is measured by the β1 estimate while sensitivity of earnings to bad 
news is measured by β1 + β3. Positive coefficients are predicted for intercept (β0) and return (β1). The positive sign 
for the intercept reflects the realised gain (good news) from previous periods recognised in the current year (Basu, 
1997). The value of β3 reflecting the incremental sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared to good news, and 
thus measures accounting conservatism. The coefficient of β3 is commonly referred to as ‘asymmetric timeliness’. 
Under greater conservatism, earnings will have higher sensitivity to bad news as compared to good news. 
Accordingly, β3 is expected to be larger than zero. 
To test the hypothesized relationships, each attribute of the board of directors and audit committee was 
interacted with each variable in Basu’s original model, as shown in equation 2. The coefficient of the interaction 
term R*D with the variable, represents the effect of the respective variable on asymmetric timeliness. For instance, 
the effect of BID on asymmetric timeliness, is observed on β7, which is the coefficient of the interaction term of 
R*D with independent directors on the board (BID*R*D). If independent directors on the board employ more 
conservatism, β7 is expected to be positive. Similar interactions were made with the remaining independent 
variables; BF to MTB, but are not shown for clarity purposes. 
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Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4BIDit + β5BIDit*Rit + β6BIDit*Dit + β7BIDit*Rit*Dit 
  + Other Internal Governance Variables and Control Variablesit + εit  (2) 
 
Six control variables included are ownership concentration, auditor, firm size (total assets), profitability, leverage 
and market to book ratio.  
4. Empirical results 
Regression results in Table 1 showed that BID, BF and ACM were significantly related to asymmetric 
timeliness. The positive significant coefficients on BID*RD and BF*RD imply that the higher the proportion of 
independent directors and financial expertise on the board, the faster the bad news is recognized into earnings 
relative to good news. The results are consistent with Beekes et al.’s (2004) and A. S. Ahmed and Duellman’s 
(2007) evidence on UK and US firms respectively. It also signifies the importance of accounting knowledge for 
directors to control manipulation or produce transparent financial information. This result supports previous 
studies that highlighted the importance of financial experts (e.g.: Rahmat, Iskandar, & Saleh, 2009; Rose & Rose, 
2008). Positive significant coefficient on ACM has proven that the minimum of four meetings held annually 
promotes effective function of audit committee. 
Table 1. Regression Results of Asymmetric Timeliness  
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4BIDit + β5BIDit*Rit + β6BIDit*Dit + β7BIDit*Rit*Dit + Other Internal Governance Variables and 
Control Variablesit + εit 
Predicted Sign Coefficient t-value 
BID*R - -0.50 -7.36*** 
BID*R*D + 1.45 3.72*** 
ACID*R - 0.14 1.45 
ACID*R*D + -0.26 -1.60 
BF*R - -0.87 -11.96*** 
BF*R*D + 0.52 1.78* 
ACF*R - 0.36 3.00*** 
ACF*R*D + 0.14 0.77 
BS*R + -0.10 -3.57*** 
BS*R*D - -0.19 -1.16 
BCD*R + -0.08 -5.20*** 
BCD*R*D - -0.11 -1.24 
ACM*R - -0.02 -0.43 
ACM*R*D + 0.31 2.20** 
Control variables Included Yes 
F- value   14.22*** 
R2 within   .2241 
N   2002 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
BID= Proportion of independent directors on board, ACID= Proportion of independent directors on audit committee, BF= Proportion of board 
members with financial expertise, ACF= Proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, 
BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-Chairman roles combine, 0 otherwise, ACM= Dummy equal 1 if audit committee meetings held per year is four 
times or more, 0 otherwise. 
+R2 within is used as a measure of goodness of fit for fixed-effect regression model (StataCorp, 2009). +Reported t-values were estimated 
based on Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) method which is robust to cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
 
ACID was found not significant. Significant coefficients for BS*R, BCD*R and ACF*R suggested that these 
attributes had a significant influence on the recognition of good news into earnings, but they had no influence on 
asymmetric timeliness. Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) argued that board size is only a factual number of 
directors, and does not reflect the directors’ skill and knowledge, essential for a board to function effectively. Since 
independent directors and financial expertise on the board had a strong positive impact on asymmetric timeliness, 
it can be assumed that the size of the board might not be an issue as there are other mechanisms working 
effectively to monitor the financial reporting process. Besides, CEO duality also had no influence on asymmetric 
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timeliness, although nearly 95% of the sample firms split the CEO-chairman roles. The result also proposed that 
split or combined roles is not relevant to the firms conservatism practices which is consistent to the findings of A. 
S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007). Eventually, the results also supported the findings of Dahya et al. (2009) and 
affirmed that though separating the two roles had been a major practice in Malaysian firms, it did not have a 
demonstrably favourable effect on the financial reports.  
5. Conclusion 
The empirical results in this study affirm the prediction that the proportions of independent directors and 
financial expertise on the board have positive effect on conservatism. Audit committee meeting leads to more 
conservatism as measured at a threshold of four meetings and above. The findings further suggest that independent 
directors and financial expertise on audit committee do not influence conservatism. Besides, no significant 
association is found for board size and CEO duality. Finally, the results reported in this study imply that a good 
internal governance structure is able to promote other governance mechanisms such as accounting conservatism, 
and hence strengthen the corporate governance of Malaysian firms.  
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